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In this paper, we focus on the research of the impact of religion and political regime on human 
capital and economic development. There is a lot of incentive literature concerning the impact of 
political regime and religion on the economic development. However, we use different approach to 
show the mutual dependence of variables and offer another aspect of economic development 
relating to religion which is secularization and the principle of equal rights. We use three equation 
model to verify two hypotheses in our paper. The first, that differences in GDP per capita among 
countries determined by technological progress are influenced by religion and political regime. 
The second, that there is the interplay between GDP and educational level and education and 
political regime. 
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Introduction 
Why are some countries rich and some poor? Many interesting books concerning 
the causes of differencies in the nations´ wealth offer a lot of explanations. Human 
capital, physical capital and technological progress are not the only factors that 
influence the economic development. The modern growth models are based on the 
neoclassical approach considering economy with no restrictions and with perfect 
competition. However, the reality is opposite. Economies are working in some 
environment that has significant impact on them. These specific characteristics of 
every single economy may influence the interaction of physical capital, human 
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capital and technological progress in such way that the growth theory does not 
need to be valid at all.  
The most frequently mentioned specific characteristics are history, culture, 
geographic location, political regime and religion. Religion and political regime 
play an important role among these specific characteristics and are usually titled 
as the institutional factors of the economic development.  
From the historical point of view the Judaic-Christian tradition is emphasized as 
essential factor of the European economic development. Conception of property 
rights dates back to biblical times and Christianity sustained and transformed it 
(Landes, 2004). Development of Christianity was accompanied by the crises 
which led in its separation. Reasons were usually connected with the efforts to 
gain the political power. The third and last splitting in the sixteenth century led to 
the creation of Protestantism as the critique of Roman-Catholic Christianity which 
influenced positively not only political regimes but also supported private 
property and business. Main requirement was to return to original sources. The 
Bible was translated into the original languages to enable common people reading 
it and its original thoughts could not be modified at authorities’ discretion. Secular 
rulers, even Church, could not do and take what they wanted. In other words, they 
could not leave out the property rights. In addition, it was followed by the 
dividing of power on secular and Church. Fractionalism and splitting of power led 
to the support of freedom and competition which are important factors of 
technological progress and economic development. 
Islam is, on the other hand, often considered as the barrier to economic 
development. The religion dominated and controlled everything and ideal 
government was the government of holy men. So called oriental despotism was 
characterized by principle that the ruler, considered as God, could dispose of lives 
and properties of his retainers. Lack of freedom and limited (if not any) property 
rights naturally suppress business, competition and economic development. On 
the other hand, there is an opposite idea trying to prove that it is not Islam what 
caused the economic underdevelopment of the Muslim world. They stress the role 
of institutions.   
To sum up, one group of researchers and scientists, such as (Huntington, 2001), 
(Landes, 2004) or (Weber, 1930) claims that religion plays an important role in 
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economic development by affecting personal behaviour and values such as 
honesty, thrift, the will to work hard etc. This argument is motivated by the 
difference in economic development and standards of living between Western 
Europe, North America and other cultural offshoots of Western Europe on the one 
side and Muslim world on the other. The critics of this approach try to offer 
broader explanations considering Muslim attitudes as dependent variables (Kuran, 
2004, 2007), (Lewis, 2002).  
The effect of political regime on economic development is studied in a vast 
number of literature. Majority of this research is concentrated on the relation 
between political regime and growth. Our approach is different in two aspects. 
The first, we use GDP per capita level as dependent variable because our model is 
based on the classical Cobb-Douglas production function. Dynamics of 
development is represented by means of panel data system. The second, we study 
the mutual dependence between political regime and GDP as literature suggests. 
The importance of democracy for economic development is accented in principle 
by institutional economics (North 1990; DeLong and Shleifer 1993).  The 
opposite idea, that economic growth leads to institutional improvements is 
supported by (Lipset 1960) and later by e.g. (Przeworski 2004; Barro 1999; or 
Glaeser et al. 2004).  
This paper wants to bring more light into the relation between religion, political 
regime and economic development. The first part of this study is focused on the 
summary and evaluation of existing literature concerning this topic. 
The second aim of this study is the evaluation of mutual dependence of human 
capital and economic development. On the one hand, human capital belongs 
among other major factors of the economic growth, and on the other hand the 
economic growth influences demand for human capital. Economic development is 
determined by technological progress which generates demand for higher human 
capital, in other words for higher educated people. The more developed economy 
leads to higher demand for education and its higher importance for society. This 
relationship was especially evident in history during industrial revolution since 
when the role of education for economic development significantly increased.  
On the basis of our hypotheses coming from our cluster analysis and previous 
literature, we designed the model of three equations where the first equation is 
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simple Cobb-Douglas production function added by the variable of political 
regime. The second equation presents the impact of GDP, political regime and 
religion on educational level. The third equation expresses the influence of GDP 
and religion on the political regime.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. The first chapter evaluates literature 
relating to the impact of religion and political regime on economic development.  
The second chapter consists of discussion about data and methodology used in the 
empirical analysis. The third chapter includes the analysis of the impact of 
political regime and religion on education and economic development of the 
countries. The first part uses the method of cluster and descriptive analysis which 
divide countries into groups on the basis of similarity of the selected variables. It 
is followed by regression analysis of the relations between educational level, GDP 
per capita and religion and political regime. The results are summarized in the 
conclusion. 
1. Relation to existing work 
Methodology, data and results of relating literature were considered when 
carrying out this research as the basis for establishing the hypotheses and 
methodological approach.  
Impact of political regime on economic development 
Literature usually offers the interplay between democracy and economic 
development. The importance of democracy for securing property rights and 
economic development is stressed in principle by institutional economics (North 
1990; DeLong and Shleifer 1993).  The opposite idea that economic growth 
causes institutional improvements is associated with (Lipset 1960) supported later 
by (Przeworski 2004; Barro 1999; or Glaeser et al. 2004).  
(Barro 1996) estimates two kinds of functional relationships (not only) between 
growth and democracy. The first one examines the influence of the following 
variables on the real GDP per capita growth rate. Independent variables were: log 
of GDP, years of male schooling, years of female schooling, log of life 
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expectancy, log of GDP multiplied by human capital1, log of fertility rate, 
government consumption ratio, public educational spending ratio, black-market 
premium, rule-of-law index, terms-of-trade change, investment ratio, democracy 
index and its square and two democracy index dummies. Functional relationship 
is estimated as a panel system of three functions, where each function corresponds 
to the period of 11 years2. The estimation is done by instrumental variables 
method, where most of the instruments are lagged values of the regressors. Barro 
results in the statement that there is non-linear relationship between democracy 
and growth, precisely – of the quadratic form. The coefficients estimated are all 
statistically significant and signs are correct3. This means, that the initial change 
of the political regime from the low-level value will bring relatively large 
increment of the economic growth rate. However, as the political regime tends to 
be more and more democratic, the contributions of these changes to the growth 
raise will be decreasingly significant. 
However, this approach does not allow for mutual relationship between 
democracy and growth. Instead, (Barro 1996) tests the possible influence of the 
economic development on the democracy in the separate system of equations. 
Again, there are three equations in the system, where each of them corresponds to 
the 10 years interval. Dependent variable is average of the democracy index 
during the corresponding interval. Independent variables are: lagged variables of 
the democracy index, log of GDP, years of attainment of the male and female 
primary schooling, infant mortality rate. Here the result is that level of economic 
development significantly influences the level of democracy, or put differently, 
the kind of political regime. So, Barro concluded that the advanced countries 
should export their economic systems to poor countries, rather than their political 
systems which are supposed to be more democratic automatically with the higher 
standard of living. 
In addition, (Barro 1996) performs addition regressions, when he adds the 
following variables in the system which estimates influence of aforementioned 
regressors on the democracy index. The additional variables are: log of life 
                                                 
1
 Overall human capital is the sum of the levels of the male and female school attendance and the 
log of life expectancy multiplied by its respective coefficient. 
2
 I.e. the first equation in the system is for 1965 – 1975. The second one is for 1975 – 1985.  And 
the third one stands for 1985 – 1995. 
3
 Positive for the democracy index and negative for the democracy index squared. 
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expectancy, income inequality, urbanization rate, OPEC dummy, log of 
population, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, dummy for former colony, dummies 
for contemporaneous colonies and dummies for kinds of religions4. From the 
religions dummies only the Hindu dummy was statistically significant. This leads 
him to the conclusion that religion is rather unimportant to the level of democracy. 
(Minier 1998) uses panel regression, control group analysis and regression-tree 
analysis to find out that countries with positive changes in democracy index 
experience significantly faster growth than countries with opposite characteristics. 
Most of existing studies work with the GDP growth as dependent variable, so they 
analyze impact of democracy on economic growth. We consider in our approach 
the impact of political regime on the standard of living expressed by the level of 
GDP per capita. We want to verify the hypothesis that „growth unfriendly“ 
political regime may cause stagnation and in the long time decline of living 
standard in economy (compared to other countries). To be more precise, the 
history proves that autocratic political regimes (aside from some exceptions) are 
in the long time associated with lower economic development or in some extreme 
examples with the bankruptcy of economy.  
Impact of religion on economic development 
(Barro R. J. et al. 2003) uses a cross-country panel including up to 59 countries to 
study the interaction between church attendance and religious beliefs and 
economic development. Data are derived from individual information in six 
international surveys between 1981 and 1999. First, the impact of economic 
development on the religiosity is analyzed with the result that religiosity tends to 
reduce with the overall economic development. This analysis is then used to 
estimate the effect of religion on economic growth with the presumption that 
higher religious beliefs stimulate growth because they influence individual 
behaviour that enhances productivity such as work ethic or thrift. The results 
confirm this hypothesis. On the other hand, increases in church attendance, for 
given religious beliefs, reduce economic growth. This approach is concentrated on 
the examination of the impact of religiosity on the economic growth even if some 
                                                 
4
 Dummies for colonies: British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, other. Dummies for religions: 
Muslim, Protestant, Eastern, Hindu, Jewish, other. Dummies for colonies and religions are put 
together to the regression of the democracy index. 
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growth equations include the shares of seven religion categories which are jointly 
statistically significant. Our approach is emphasized on the impact of certain 
religions such as Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, etc. on the political regime and 
education and thus on economic development.  
One group of researchers and scientists, such as (Huntington, 2001), (Landes, 
2004) or (Weber, 1930) claims that religion plays an important role in economic 
development by affecting personal behaviour and values such as honesty, thrift, 
the will to work hard etc. Christianity and especially Protestantism are believed to 
have positive influence on economic development by means of support of the 
private property and business which led to competition and technological 
progress. Private property and law ensuring its existence supported later the 
dividing of power on secular and Church. So called secularization meant that the 
public goods and affairs were provided by the secular government and no more by 
the Church. Secular government was more flexible, reacting faster on social and 
economic development by establishing the adequate institutions. Secularization is 
stressed by mentioned authors as the positive factor of economic development in 
Europe. On the other side, (Stark, 1994) as sociologists tried to deny the concept 
of secularization by means of argument that majority of society in the Middle 
Ages was not more religious than today. The authors say that secularization is a 
myth and thus could not happen at all. We can not agree with this statement 
because secularization, as defined, is not connected with the ordinary people and 
religiosity of the whole society. Secularization relates to the breaking of powers 
and thus influences the governments and institutions in a country. 
The Weber’s argument explains the positive effect of Protestant ethics on 
economic development and was examined by various authors. (Becker, 2007) by 
means of simple growth model with human capital modified this argument with 
the statement that Protestantism led to higher educational level which positively 
influenced the economic growth. In other words, the Protestant ethics such as 
honesty, thrift, the will to work hard were not the “engines” of economic growth 
in the Western Europe as stressed by Weber. However, the translation of Bible 
into the national languages led to higher educational level of population and was 
the base for the economic growth in the Protestant countries. (Blum, 2001) tested 
growth theories in the period of 1500 – 1750 and did not prove the Weber’s 
hypothesis about the positive impact of Protestant ethics on economic growth in 
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Europe, too. On the other hand, they supported some of the Weber´s hypotheses, 
e.g. positive influence of information networks, high level of specialization of the 
Protestant cities or the observation of contracts among people who did not know 
each other.  
The role of religion for education and thus economic development was seen in 
Jewish history, too. (Botticini, 2005) emphasized the transformation of Jewish 
religion about the year 70 a.d. toward understanding Tora. Each Jew was 
responsible for teaching his sons to read and understand Jewish rules. By this fact 
Jews gained the competitive advantage in the form of human capital that could be 
offered in the market.  
In terms of Islam, there are also two groups of researchers. One group emphasizes 
the negative effect of Islam on economic development while the other one is 
trying to prove that it is not Islam itself that works against the economic growth. 
The first group (e.g. Huntington, 2001, Landes, 2004) claims that the conviction 
that God is the only one, almighty, sovereign, eternal and disposes of lives and 
properties of his retainers led to not only lack of freedom and limited property 
rights suppressing business, competition and economic development but also to 
fatalism. Another aspect of Islam is insignificance of individuals. Human being is 
part of the society serving to God. This aspect is evident in common worship. It 
discouraged the individual efforts and thus competition. Other factors which hold 
down the economic development are personalism, laziness, lack of curiosity, 
mistrust of science, conservatism and traditionalism. These features are 
commonly called Islamic culture. On the other hand, (Kuran, 2007) tries to 
explain that the cause of economic underdevelopment in the Muslim world should 
be seen in inadequate institutions. He claims that all of the previously mentioned 
characteristics can not be denied but can be seen in other religions, too. He 
emphasizes that mentioned characteristics of human behaviour are symptoms of 
institutional deficiencies that started to reveal in times of industrial revolution in 
the western civilizations in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Middle East suffered 
from the lack of adequate organizational capabilities to use new technologies. 
Islamic law formed a system of institutions that are responsible for low economic 
level of the Muslim world. These institutions include law of partnerships, 
inheritance regulations and waqf. As Kuran says “these elements of Islamic law 
delayed the transition from personal to impersonal exchange, discouraged the use 
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of the technologies of mass production, kept civil society weak, and set the stage 
for sustained authoritarian rule”. 
2. Data and methodology 
The first part of the analysis is based on the cluster methodology with the aim to 
divide countries into groups with the similar characteristics. Clusters are 
established on the basis of four variables: religion (as the prevailing religion in the 
country), political regime, GDP per capita and average years of education. 
Data for religion is taken from the World Almanac and Book of Facts5 and 
include:  Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous, Aboriginal, Animist, Traditional faith 
groups, Judaism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Roman 
Catholic Christianity, Confucianism and Christianity imported to Africa strongly 
influenced by the traditional faiths. 
The measure for political regime is based on data from the Polity IV6 data 
collection. A country's so called Polity score, which ranges from -10 for a full 
autocracy to +10 for a full democracy. Indicator for each country is counted as the 
average Polity score from 1975 to the present. The average for the long period is 
used to express long-term positive or negative impact of the political regime on 
the economic development and education. GDP per capita in the year 2003 is 
taken from the World Bank database and is expressed in the purchasing power 
parity, in constant 2000 international $. Data for average years in education in the 
year 2003 is also taken from the World Bank database. The analysis is carried out 
on the sample of 110 countries. 
The second part of the analysis carries out regression analysis of the relation 
among education, GDP per capita, political regime and religion. The analysis is 
based on the panel data covering 60 countries (cross-sections) and spans over 6 
years (1998-2004). We had made a restriction on the length of time-series, since 
data about educational level are very rare before the year 1998. We are aware of 
the fact, that namely a political regime influences the economy in the long-run, 
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 Normally, the only source of information about the religion make up of a country comes from 
that country’s government census. Sometimes political concerns influence the government’s 
reports. Data is based on self – reporting. If a person considers himself to be a Christian, he or she 
is counted as a Christian. Various religious groups use other criteria for membership.  
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but because we did not want to drop education variable from our analysis (and 
possibly make a misspecification error), we have chosen a short time span instead. 
However, even after reducing our data time dimension to six years, there are still a 
few gaps in them. Due to availability of data about education, indicator had to be 
changed and is measured as total public expenditure on education as a percent of 
GDP. Physical capital is expressed as gross fixed capital formation as a percent of 
GDP. Data for both indicators is taken from the World Bank Statistics. Data about 
GDP p.c. is taken from International Monetary Fund, religion and political regime 
as in the cluster analysis. All data presented here are in yearly frequencies. More 
details about data in our analysis are described later in section Data limitations. 
3. Empirical analysis of the impact of political 
regime and religion on education and economic 
development 
Cluster and descriptive analysis 
The countries are divided into two groups according to cluster analysis. Groups 
are created on the basis of four variables: religion, education, political regime and 
GDP per capita. The first cluster includes 49 countries and the second one 61 
countries.  
 
The first cluster includes 49 countries7 with the total population of 1,4 mld. and 
the characteristics: 
14,5 years of education, average GDP per capita at the level of 16413 $, 
usually democratic political regimes (5,8 on average), 100 % of Roman 
Catholic Christian countries,  100 % of Protestant Catholic countries, 18,2 % 
                                                                                                                                     
6
 Data is taken from Polity IV Country Report 2003 Series edited by Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.   
7
 USA, Canada, Mexico, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Japan, Australia, Israel, Cyprus, Philippines, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay 
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of Orthodox Christian countries, 100 % of Judaism (only Israel) and 16,7 % of 
Buddhist countries. 
The second cluster consists of 61 countries8 with 3,9 mld. inhabitants (this cluster 
includes two most populated countries, China and India) and the characteristics: 
9,9 years of education, 3615 $ of GDP per capita, usually not democratic 
political regime (-2,4), 81,8 % of Orthodox Christian countries, 100 % of 
Muslim countries, 100 % of Hindu countries, 100 % of Christianity influenced 
by the traditional faiths (mainly in Africa), 83,8 % of Buddhist countries, 100 
% of Confucian countries (only China) and 100% of Indigenous, Aboriginal 
and Animist countries.  
The analysis shows that the higher level of GDP and education is connected with 
democratic political regime and mainly Roman Catholic and Protestan 
Christianity and Judaism. On the other side, low level of GDP and education is 
characterized by  more autocratic political regimes and predominantly Islam and 
Hinduism. 
 
Figure 1 Statistical verification of variables in the cluster analysis 
Regarding statistical verification of variables in the cluster analysis, all variables 
contribute to the formation of the clusters because the values of Student’ s t test 
for continuous variables and Chi-square for categorical variable exceed the critical 
line. Positive values of statistics indicate that the variable takes generally larger 
than average value, negative values indicate that the variable takes generally 
smaller than average value. So, in the first cluster, GDP per capita, education and 
indicator of political regime is usually higher than average value. On the opposite, 
the variables usually get lower than average values in the second cluster.  
It is supposed that the length of education in the economy is determined by the 
level of GDP and institutional factors, mainly by the type of political regime and 
religion. Political regime and religion make up the institutional environment 
influencing the behaviour of individuals and thus economic relations and the 
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 Guyana, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Comoros, Mauritius, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Iran, 
Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazachstan, China, Mongolia, Korea, 
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economic success expressed by the level of GDP. The level of GDP determines 
the demand for education because more developed economies have higher need 
for education which is expressed by higher wages connected with higher 
education. And this is subsequently the factor for motivation of people to invest 
more in education and offer their “human capital” as the factor of economic 
growth. That is why GDP influences education and education influences GDP. 
 
Figure 2 Education and GDP 
Figure 3 Education and pol. regime 
Figure 2 shows relation between education and GDP. It is evident that higher 
GDP is connected with higher education. However, the curve is not linear. At the 
beginning, when the GDP and education is low, there is little interaction between 
educational level and GDP. GDP and education are mostly correlated in the 
interval between 10 and 15 years of education and about 7000 and 20 000 $ of 
GDP per capita. Higher GDP associated with more technologically developed 
countries brings higher demand for education and thus better utilization of the 
human capital. At the other end of the curve the slope is decreasing because the 
length of formal education at schools does not grow unlimitedly (the limit is 
graduation at university). The Pearson Correlation coefficient of education and 
GDP is 0,78 at 0,01 level. 
Figure 3 showing distribution of education and political regime also indicates 
positive influence of political regime on the education even if there is a higher 
deviation. More democratic regime is connected with longer education. The 
Pearson Correlation coefficient (0.65) is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
It is evident that democratic systems support higher educational level. Democracy 
supports freedom but also independence and responsibility for own life. These 
aspects encourage business and competition which are important features of 
western democratic civilizations. The need to compete motivates individuals to 
invest more in education which enables them to gain better paid job and better 
social position. 
On the other side, higher level of education and economic development has 
positive feedback on democracy (stressed also in Glaeser et al. 2007). Educated 
                                                                                                                                     
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, Fiji, Benin, 
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people require political participation and equality of the rights. Modern education 
brings freedom from preconceptions and traditional forms of authority. It is 
supposed that educated people do not follow authorities but try to think 
independently. They better understand their private interests and are able to think 
in long-term periods. Fear of educated people is one of the reasons of low level of 
education in the totalitarian systems in spite of the fact that it is not possible to 
deny (in particular nowadays) the necessity of high number of highly qualified 
people for the economic development. 
The most economically developed regions, The Western Europe and The 
Northern America, which have the oldest and the most stable liberal democracies, 
are the examples of the impact of economic development on the democratization. 
The Southern Europe joined them in the 1970s. Similar impact of economic 
development on the democratization of society is evident in Asia, too. Japan was 
the first country which reached the fastest economic development in Asia in the 
20th century as well as the stable liberal democracy. Australia and New Zealand, 
countries with strong European influence, naturally recorded the economic 
development and democratization long before the World War II. Regarding 
formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe, the most developed of them 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Poland) reached the full 
democracy earlier than less developed ones (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania). 
Russian Federation is on the similar level of the economic development as some 
other Latin American countries, e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Chile or Mexico and as 
well as they Russia does not have ensured stable democratic system. Africa, as the 
least developed part of the world, has nowadays only several democratic countries 
that are moreover not stable according to the Polity IV indicator. The only 
exception presents the Middle East where some countries reach high level of GDP 
per capita although they have autocratic political regimes. This is caused by the 
income from the oil production. 
 
Figure 4 Education and religion 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of education depending on religion. The highest 
level of education is connected with Protestant Christianity, followed by the 
                                                                                                                                     
Burundi, Kenya 
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Roman Catholic Christianity and Judaism. Lower level of education is linked to 
Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism. The third group is made up of 
Muslim countries that reach the lowest level of education.  
Distribution of religion, GDP and political regime is described in a more detail in 
tables 4 and 5. Education is divided into four groups that are similar to ISCED 
classification. The numbers in brackets express average years spent in education 
within each education category.  
“Without” category includes 14 countries with the lowest level of education, the 
lowest GDP per capita, autocratic political regimes. 79 % countries within this 
category are Muslim countries and 14.3 % Indigenous, Aboriginal and Animist. 
33 countries are included in the “Primary” category with the median GDP at the 
level of 2669 $, unstable and more autocratic political regimes. GDP in this 
category is higher by 253.9 % compared to the “Without” category and indicates 
significant interaction between GDP and level of education. There are mostly 
Muslim countries and countries with Christianity mixed with the traditional faiths 
within this category.  
“Secondary” education is connected with 6126 $ of GDP per capita which means 
smaller change compared to primary education. Political regime could be 
characterized as unstable and undemocratic and majority of the countries endorse 
to Roman Catholic Christian, Muslim and Orthodox Christian religion.  
“Tertiary” education indicates another large change of GDP compared to the 
previous category (353.9 %) and median GDP exceeds 20000 $. Political regime 
is more democratic and prevailing religions are Roman Catholic and Protestant 
Christianity. 
The highest level of education “Tertiary upper” consists of only 5 the most 
developed countries with the highest GDP per capita, democratic political regime 
and mainly Protestant Christianity.  
Percent distribution of the countries with certain religion in education categories 
is included in the table 6. 36.4 % of the Protestant Christian countries reach the 
highest (Tertiary upper) education, 54.5 % Tertiary and 9.1 % Secondary. Roman 
Catholic Christian countries reach mostly Tertiary and Secondary education. Only 
2.9 % of them are included in Tertiary upper category. Judaism is represented 
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only by one country which falls into category Tertiary. Tertiary education is 
reached also by 16.7 % of Buddhist, 9.1 % Orthodox Christian countries and 7.7 
of Christian countries with the features of traditional faiths. On the other side, 
Muslim countries reach max. secondary education (25.9 %), 33.3 % are included 
in the category primary and 40.7 % in the category without education.  
Data shows the correlation between religion and education. However, it is not 
possible to make explanation without reference to political regime. Since it was 
religion what influenced mainly formation of the political regime which 
determined the institutional environment in society. The significant impact of 
political regime on economic development and education was described in the 
previous sections. The analysis resulted in the statement that more democratic 
political regime brings higher GDP per capita and higher level of education.  
Religion that supports education and democracy should include toleration and 
equalitarianism in the sense of equal rights. Then, it is no wonder that the 
Christian countries generally belong to developed democratic societies. 
Christianity has already adopted this principle of equal rights for all people on the 
basis of their ability of moral choice in the times of the Reformation. Literature 
offers two reasons for this development. (Blum, 2001) or (Botticini, 2005) 
emphasized the role of education. According to them, the translation of Bible into 
the national languages and understanding Tora led to higher education with the 
positive impact on democratization and economic development. On the other 
hand, (Landes, 2004) and (Huntington, 2001) connect positive development in the 
Christian countries with the process of secularization. They stress that the 
separation of secular and Church power led to the support of property rights, 
private property and business which is positive for the economic development 
particularly in consequence of its impact on the democratization of society. The 
driving force for the secularization in Christianity was Protestantism and 80 % of 
countries with the highest level of GDP per capita and highest level of education 
are countries endorsing to the Protestant Christianity.  
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Regression analysis 
Cluster and descriptive analysis and other related literature support hypotheses 
that are summarized as follows: 
 Economic level (expressed usually as GDP per capita) and growth is 
determined by human capital (approximated the most frequently by the 
educational level), physical capital and technological progress. This approach 
is based on the neoclassical conditions of economic growth and thus on the 
assumption of no restrictions in economy. However, the reality is different. The 
conditions of business and any behaviour of “participants” in a society are 
determined by institutions that are established by the political regime.  
 Educational level is influenced by the economic level in a society, by political 
regime and religion. Political regime establishes institutions and directly 
influences the extent, quality and access to education. Higher GDP per capita is 
connected with technological progress that creates higher demand for more 
educated people.  
 Political regime is influenced by religion and educational level. Religion 
played and has been playing the important role for establishing of priorities and 
values in a society and thus influencing political regime and education. 
Moreover, the religion has also direct political power in countries which are 
not secularized (or only partially). Regarding the impact of educational level on 
political regime, it is supposed that more educated people prefer democratic 
political system.  
 
Defining the model 
In accordance with suggested hypotheses we define our baseline model used for 
empirical analysis of expected relationships between selected variables. The 
model has a following form: 
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Apparently, we have a panel-data system consisting of three equations. All 
variables, except for religion dummies, are in natural logarithms. GDP denotes 
Gross domestic product per capita, CAP means physical capital, EDU expresses 
human capital approximated most frequently by educational level, REG is an 
indicator of political regime9, REL is a set of dummies determining the type of 
prevailing religion in a given country. α1, α2 and α3 are constants where α1 
includes the effect of technological progress resp. multifactor productivity and α2, 
α3 the effect of benchmark religion category. β1 to β39 are coefficients, where β1, 
β2 , β10  and β(26 – 31) are strongly expected to be positive. 
The first equation in the system is simply a Cobb-Douglas production function 
extended by political aspects. We have added this variable to C-D function to 
express the impact of political regime on economic development.  
The second equation captures the influence of GDP, political regime and religion 
of given economy on the education. Although the political regime variables are 
included in the first equation of the system (1) and therefore their influence is 
already built in GDP p.c. variable, we include them in the second equation once 
again. This decision is based on our assumption that political regime influences 
the education not only through GDP p.c. indirectly, but also more firmly (e.g. 
                                                 
9
 PolityIV index can be found here: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/. For purpose of 
estimation, we have modified it by adding a scalar of arbitrary value 11.1. This allows us to take 
logs of all (namely negative) values of indexes. Since this alteration is proportional to all values, 
the results are intact. 
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political regime and religion may influence a structure, quality and access to 
education). Inclusion of religion and GDP into the second equation corresponds to 
our hypothesis about the influence of religion and GDP on the educational level.  
The third equation shows the expected impact of GDP and religion on the political 
regime. The hypothesis rather supposes the impact of educational level (instead of 
GDP) on the political regime in the sense that more educated people usually 
prefer more democratic regime. However, we are forced to use GDP indicator 
because of availability of data about education.10 The impact of data on the results 
of our research is discussed in a more detail in the section Data limitations. 
Supposing the mutual dependence of GDP and educational level we therefore 
replaced education by GDP.  
Since, at least theoretically, and as our cluster analysis and other literature 
suggests, should be wealth, the level of education and the political regime 
mutually dependent, we employ the model given by the system (1). We suggest 
using panel data system not only to observe more data but prevailingly to show 
the dynamics of development. In other words, we want to show the dependence of 
regressands on suggested explanatory variables both across countries and in time. 
We also suggest using indicator of political regime in the first two equations and 
GDP in the third equation as lagged variables since it is supposed that GDP and 
educational level respond to the change of political regime with a lapse of time 
and with the long-run effect. Political regime will react on the change of 
educational level (in our case unfortunately approximated by GDP) with the 
delay, too. Our aim is therefore confirmation or rejection of suggested hypotheses. 
 
Data limitations 
Regarding the data availability, the quantification of human capital poses the 
biggest problem. Due to its qualitative character, the indicator of human capital 
will always be the approximation of the real value of human capital. Literature 
offers three approaches how to measure human capital: 1) the highest attained 
education which is usually described by either the share of labour force with at 
                                                 
10
 The only publicly available data (that were available for us) about education that would cover at 
least several years for the most possible number of countries is data expressing public education 
expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
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least upper secondary education or average years in education; 2) direct 
measurement of skills; and 3) estimation of market value of human capital on the 
basis of wage. The most frequently used approach for empirical analysis is the 
first one because of availability of data. However, although these two indicators 
are published by several international organizations, e. g. World Bank, Unesco or 
OECD, data is not (at least publicly) available for longer time. Intending apply 
panel data system, we were forced to choose another indicator associated with 
education with data available for sufficient number of countries and years. The 
only acceptable indicator meeting our demands was the total public education 
expenditure as a percent of the GDP for which we received at least six years 
(1998-2004) in a row. However, there are still a few gaps in data. Thus, our panel 
and therefore whole system (1) is unbalanced. It is necessary to take it into 
consideration when interpreting the results of our analysis.  
 
Expression of physical capital as gross fixed capital formation as a percent of the 
GDP has its limitations, too. It does not really measure the whole stock of 
physical capital but it is generally accepted in empirical works.  
 
Which type of religion seems to influence the education the most? 
Here we want to decide, which kind of religion was the most influential one, in 
terms of the impact on the educational level. Any religion category could be used 
as benchmark dummy variable but for easier readability of our estimations we 
want to use religion which is connected with the highest level of education. 
However, considering the limitations of our indicator of educational level and 
supposing the interdependence between the GDP and educational level, we 
estimate the impact of religion on the GDP. Therefore, we employ function A(1), 
which we treat as an auxiliary regression considered as some kind of help-tool. 
∑
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The GDP is in non-logarithmic form. Constant was dropped to allow us to 
identify the “strength” of the various kinds of religion, in terms of their influence 
on a wealth. Regression output can be found in table 6. 
We can clearly see, that the most influential one, in terms mentioned above, was 
Protestant Religion, closely followed by Buddhism. The “worst” ones were 
clearly the Indigenous, Hindu and Muslim religion dummies. One can 
immediately see the huge gap between this group of religion types and the others. 
These findings are fully consistent with results of our cluster analysis and with our 
theoretical expectations. 
Results of the system (1) 
To solve the system (1), Zellner’s SUR method was used11. This should make our 
results robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation. The 
output of regression from the software package appears in table 7. 
Results from the first equation suggest that only human capital (approximated by 
public education expenditures per GDP) had the influence on wealth. What is 
quite surprising is the statistical insignificance of the capital and technological 
factors. Both of them are quite highly insignificant (although they have correct 
signs). There may be several reasons for that: The first, our data time span is too 
short to be able to discover and confirm expected relationship between variables 
of the system (1). The second, there are some gaps in the data for some cross-
sections. The third, our sample of included countries is relatively small (60 
countries).  All of these may have rendered our results to be a somewhat 
misleading and, thus, the theoretical relationships strongly suggested by various 
literature or by our cluster analysis were not empirically confirmed. 
The second equation shows, that GDP p.c. influenced the education, as expected. 
From political regimes variables, only those lagged by five (in the 1st equation) 
and four and five years (in the 2nd equation) are statistically significant. What 
seems really interesting is, that signs of coefficients change between years. One 
possible reason for this may be, for example, the negative change in the political 
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regime of given country and the simultaneous or the subsequent positive change 
of the GDP. The rise of the GDP may have been influenced by some other, non-
political factors. Hence, the linear relationship suggested by the regression may 
appear to be negative.  The regression results may confirm the fact, that political 
regime influences wealth and education namely in the long run and with a long-
lasting effect. 
From religion dummies, in the second equation only Roman Catholic Christian 
and Buddhism dummies were statistically significant. In the third equation, only 
Muslim and Imported Christian dummies were significant.  Looking at the 
coefficients of given significant coefficients, we may conclude, that the influence 
of these kinds of religion on the education and political regime respectively is 
weaker compared to the benchmark dummy (Protestant Christian). 
When examining the possible influence of GDP on the political regime, our 
results look quite disappointing, since all coefficients are highly statistically 
insignificant. But we should bear in mind, that firstly, with better data availability 
the indicator of educational level would be used here instead of GDP as our 
hypothesis suggests. Secondly, economic level most probably influences the type 
of political regime with much longer delay. Although wealth and educational level 
of the citizens grow, their striving for a more democratic regime will probably 
take quite a lot of time, before the change of the political regime happens. 
Considering the whole model, we may see, that it performs quite well, if we take 
into consideration the relatively poor data availability, the rough proxy used for 
the education variable and gaps in the data. Graphical residuals testing shows a 
mild and relatively weak cross-correlation between the equations’ residuals. Using 
the correlation matrix of the residuals indicates again the only minimal and 
negligible correlation. Breusch-Pagan test of independence thus displays highly 
statistically significant results of the F-statistics, again confirming possible cross-
correlation between equation of the system (1). Using the rule-of-thumb of the 
exceeding the value of the pair-wise correlation between regressors set to 0.8, we 
conclude that the collinearity is not present (the maximum value in the 
correspondent correlation matrix was slightly above 0.4). The testing of the 
                                                                                                                                     
11
 All estimated models were tested for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, multicollinearity and 
normality of residuals. All models are valid in terms of these tests unless it is said otherwise.  
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residuals for the normality shows that residuals are most probably asymptotically 
normally distributed. Thus, one has to be cautious in interpreting the results or 
when making some conclusions and predictions. 
Testing the long-run influence of political regime on wealth 
Since in the system (1) we were restricted to only six observations per a cross-
section, we could not make use of data about GDP p.c. and political regime, 
which span over the period of 1975 – 200412. Thus, we will now test the equation 
(1), where the GDP p.c. is solely dependent on the current and lagged up to 5 
years political regime, added by religion which woud be ideally used in the 
second and third equation in our system. This will allow us to check our 
hypothesis of strong and long-lasting influence of these factors on wealth in the 
long-run. Equation (1) is defined as: 
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Output from the regression package can be found in table 8. Note, that we had to 
reduce the number of cross-sections to 51 to obtain balanced panel and the third 
and the seventh religion dummy (Orthodox and Buddhist) had to be dropped to 
avoid collinearity. Other dummies are relative to the Protestant Catholic dummy. 
We had to employ the FGLS regression to account for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation. 
The results are fairly clear. All independent variables are highly statistically 
significant, and Wald test shows, that all the regressors are jointly significant as 
well. Notice, that all religion dummies perform worse than the Protestant Catholic 
(benchmark) dummy. These results are in line with our theoretical expectations as 
well as with results of our cluster analysis and our auxiliary “religion” 
                                                 
12
 Data for GDP p.c. variable was taken from World Bank Statistics for the purpose of this 
estimation. 
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regression’s (A(1)) results. It is also clear, that the political regime is influential in 
the long-run and has a positive and statistically significant long-lasting effect. 
Although we only apply the linear relationship between GDP and political regime, 
our results confirm (Barro’s 1996) conclusion, that political regime matters in the 
economic development and its influence on wealth is positive. 
Conclusion 
The cluster and descriptive analysis showed mutual relation between education 
and economic development, political regime and religion. It is evident that 
education as the significant part of the human capital belongs together with the 
physical capital and technological progress to the main factors of economic 
growth. Nevertheless, there must be demand for education which increases with 
the economic development. Education seems to be the motivation factor since the 
industrialization of economy.  
Education and economic development is influenced by political regime and 
religion which both determine the institutional environment. The highest 
education and economic level are reached in the countries with full democracy. 
Democratic regime influences positively, in the sense of ensuring the freedom and 
property rights, that support business and competition and thus economic 
development. Economic development subsequently requires a larger number of 
qualified, educated inhabitants. Educated persons subsequently have backward 
impact on the support of democratic regime by involving in political affairs and 
require freedom and equal rights. Fear of educated people may be the reason why 
the autocratic systems usually have low level of education and GDP per capita.  
Furthermore, the results show that democratic regimes are successfully 
established particularly in the Christian countries. The reasons why seem to be 
firstly in the process of secularization that began much sooner in the Christian 
countries than in other religions. This aspect is supported by (Landes, 2004) and 
(Huntington, 2001). Secondly, establishing of the principle of equal rights and 
translation of Bible into the national languages in the times of Reformation and 
understanding Tora are emphasized by (Blum, 2001) or (Botticini, 2005) as the 
factors for higher education with the positive impact on democratization and 
economic development. On the contrary, the Muslim countries, where Islam 
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significantly influences law and political regimes, are usually autocratic with low 
level of economic development and education. So, the results suggest that 
religions which set forward the process of secularization with the dividing of 
secular and Church power and adopted the principle of equal rights support 
education and democratic political regimes which subsequently positively 
influence economic development. And educated people consequently positively 
support democratic regime.  
However, we do not want to say that Islam is a source of economic 
underdevelopment in the Muslim countries. We do not emphasize the positive 
effect of Protestant ethics on economic development. We really agree with 
Kuran’s or Rubin’s arguments that Islamic law formed a system of inadequate 
institutions that are responsible for low economic level in the Muslim world. We 
offer another aspect of religion influence on economic development which is 
secularization and the principle of equal rights. 
On the basis of cluster and descriptive analysis we established the model. The 
regression analysis proved that it performs quite well and thus is supportive 
regarding the mentioned results. However, one has to consider the poor data 
availability for the indicator of human capital that forced us to use short period. It 
would be interesting and useful to verify the model with better indicator for 
human capital, e.g. average years in education, which would be available for each 
country and for more years in a row.     
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FIGURE 1 STATISTICAL VERIFICATION OF VARIABLES IN THE CLUSTER ANALYSIS
 11 
FIGURE 2 EDUCATION AND GDP 12 
FIGURE 3 EDUCATION AND POL. REGIME 12 
FIGURE 4 EDUCATION AND RELIGION 13 
 
Tab 1 Cluster distribution 
 N % of Total 
Cluster 1 49 44,5% 
  2 61 55,5% 
Total 110 100,0% 
 
Tab 2 Centroids of the clusters 
  
longPol GDP edu 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Cluster 1 5,79 4,05 16412,85 10276,37 14,69 2,43 
  2 -2,42 4,20 3615,29 3076,81 9,90 2,98 
  Comb. 1,23 5,81 9316,02 9619,97 12,03 3,64 
 
 
Tab 3 Distribution of religions in the clusters   
  
1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 
Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. 
Clust 1 34 100% 11 100% 2 18,2% 0 ,0% 
  2 0 ,0% 0 ,0% 9 81,8% 27 100% 
  Com. 34 100% 11 100% 11 100% 27 100% 
 
Continuation 
5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 9,00 10,00 
Freq Perc Freq Perc Freq Perc Freq Perc Freq Perc Freq Perc 
1 100% 0 ,0% 0 ,0% 1 16,7% 0 ,0% 0 ,0% 
0 ,0% 3 100% 13 100% 5 83,3% 1 100% 3 100% 
1 100% 3 100% 13 100% 6 100% 1 100% 3 100% 
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Note: 1 = Roman Catholic Christianity, 2 = Protestant Christianity, 3 = Orthodox Christianity, 4 = 
Islam, 5 = Judaism, 6 = Hinduism, 7 = Christianity (influenced by the traditional faiths in Africa), 
8 = Buddhism, 9 = Confucianism, 10 = Indigenous, Aboriginal, Animist, Traditional faith groups 
 
Tab 4  GDP, political regime and religion depending on the level of education 
Average years in 
education 
GDP per 
capita 
(median) 
Change 
of GDP 
(%) Pol (median) 
Number of 
countries 
Religion (% of countries within 
educational categories) 
Without (5,4) 1051   -4.4 14 79%M, 14,3%I, 7%CHimp*  
Primary (10,2) 2669 253.9 -2.4 33 
18.2%R, 27.3%M, 12.1%B, 
6.1%H,O, 3% I,C, 
24.2%CHimp    
Secondary (12,8) 6126 229.5 0.7 33 
36.4%R, 21.2%M, 24.2%O, 
3.1%B,P,H, 9.1CHimp 
Tertiary (15,8) 21682 353.9 7,6 25 
60%R, 24%P, 
4%B,J,O,CHimp  
Tertiary (upper) 
(19) 27506 126.9 10 5 80%P,20%R 
*  CHimp = Christianity imported to Africa (influenced by the traditional faiths) 
Tab 5  Religion depending on education 
  
Religion % 
O P R J CHimp M B H I C 
Without     7.7 40.7   66.7  
Primary 18.2  17.6  61.5 33.3 66.7 66.7 33.3 100 
Secondary 72.7 9.1 35.3  23.1 25.9 16.7 33.3   
Tertiary 9.1 54.5 44.1 100 7.7  16.7    
Tertiary (upper)  36.4 2.9        
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: O = Orthodox Christianity, P = Protestant Christianity, R = Roman Catholic Christianity, J = 
Judaism, CHimp = Christianity in Africa influenced by the traditional faith groups, M = Muslims, 
B = Buddhism, H = Hinduism, I = Indigenous, animist and traditional faith groups, C = 
Confucianism 
 
Tab 6 Regression output for GDP – religion relationship 
Variable Coefficient Standard errors 
29 
Independent variable - GDP 
REL1 Roman Christian 8315.5290 263.8740 
REL2 Protestant Christian 21400.6600 426.8033 
REL3 Orthodox Christian 14970.9600 821.0328 
REL4 Muslim 2539.0400 170.5849 
REL5 Judaism 18281.8400 1072.6670 
REL6 Hindu 1545.0400 79.2418 
REL7 Imported Christian 3854.9870 233.5141 
REL8 Buddhism 21247.7900 1388.6570 
REL9 Indigenous 937.6007 43.5471 
Wald-test probability 0.0000 - 
Note: All coefficients were significant at 1% level. Method: FGLS. 
 
Tab 7 Regression output for System (1) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Equation 1. – Dependent variable: GDP 
Constant 0.8825 1.2022 
CAP 0.4453 0.2922 
EDU 1.7911*** 0.2396 
REG 1.4240 7.7485 
REG(-1) -0.6238 7.7659 
REG(-2) -1.1438 0.9504 
REG(-3) 2.0054 1.3715 
REG(-4) 1.7379 1.3382 
REG(-5) -1.9395** 0.8039 
Adj. R2 0.3440 - 
F-stat. probability 0.0000 - 
Equation 2. – Dependent variable: EDU 
Constant 0.0249 0.4313 
GDP 0.2166*** 0.0402 
REG -2.0164 2.6803 
REG(-1) 2.0526 2.6803 
REG(-2) 0.0606 0.3351 
REG(-3) -0.6885 0.4731 
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REG(-4) -0.8434* 0.4625 
REG(-5) 1.3081*** .02533 
REL Roman Catholic -0.1460** 0.0659 
REL Orthodox -0.0485 0.1100 
REL Muslim -0.0464 0.1279 
REL Judaism 0.1705 0.1716 
REL Hindu -0.1127 0.1426 
REL Imported Christian 0.1937 0.1228 
REL Buddhism -0.4193** 0.1719 
REL Indigenous -0.0401 0.2160 
Adj. R2 0.4927 - 
F-stat. probability 0.0000 - 
Equation 3. – Dependent variable: REG 
Constant 1.4498** 0.6681 
GDP -0.7101 1.7241 
GDP(-1) 1.3255 2.6863 
GDP(-2) -0.9887 2.0607 
GDP(-3) -0.3209 2.7755 
GDP(-4) 0.1519 2.5580 
GDP(-5) 0.7088 1.6722 
REL Roman Catholic 0.0612 0.1008 
REL Orthodox 0.0596 0.1705 
REL Muslim -0.3991** 0.1846 
REL Judaism -0.0612 0.2655 
REL Hindu -0.0946 0.2085 
REL Imported Christian -0.4548*** 0.1751 
REL Buddhism 0.1188 0.2582 
REL Indigenous -0.0464 0.3801 
Adj. R2 0.3295 - 
F-stat. probability 0.0000 - 
*,**,*** marks significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Statistically significant 
coefficients are bolded. Method: SUR. 
 
Tab 8 Regression output for the equation (1) 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Dependent variable: GDP 
Constant 9.4660 0.0444 
REG 0.0235 0.0030 
REG(-1) 0.0140 0.0031 
REG(-2) 0.0051* 0.0031 
REG(-3) 0.0218 0.0030 
REG(-4) 0.0168 0.0029 
REG(-5) 0.0240 0.0027 
REL Roman Catholic -0.7863 0.0473 
REL Muslim -2.0832 0.0473 
REL Judaism -0.1647 0.0518 
REL Hindu -1.2785 0.1255 
REL Imported Christian -1.0856 0.0771 
REL Indigenous -2.7767 0.0530 
Wald-test probability 0.0000 - 
Note: All coefficients, except for REG(-2) were significant at 1% level. * marks significance at 
10% level. Method: FGLS. 
 
 
 
 
